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The 1960's were an optimistic decade in public policy. We passed 
legislation to eradicate racism, poverty and inequality, confident that we 
would create a 'great society.' Ironically,most of the same social ills still 
plague our country and,without the optimism of the sixties, these problems 
now seem insurmountable and overwhelming. 
By the 1970's it was clear that passing legislation often did little to 
resolve social problems. Assumptions that laws were self-implementing no 
longer seemed valid. Traditional distinctions between laws-makers and 
administrators seemed suddenly fuzzy. 
Public policy implementation began to attract attention. Much early 
work on policy implementation viewed the implementation process in terms 
of "the transmission belt" theory of administration (Stewart, 1975) in which 
implementors act as a conduit for authoritative- decisions. Responses other 
than compliance are characterized as correctable pathologies (e.g., goal 
displacement) or as weaknesses arising elsewhere in the system (e.g., 
unclear statutes) or inherent characteristics of the problem (e.g., amount of 
change required) or unreasonable expectation (e.g., implementation 
requiring technology not yet invented). Much of this research led to 
catastrophizing about prospects for successful implementation, (i.e., statutes 
were too vague to implement without substantial reinterpretation, but the 
compromises required to pass legislation meant that legislation would be 
vague). New models of public policy implementation developed to identify 
critical variables. 
As the field of implementation research expanded, studies 
documented successful implementation of policies and programs involving 
factors found to inhibit implementation by other studies. Clarity of 
legislation was identified as an important variable for successful 
3 
implementation (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). Yet, successful cases of 
implementation of statutes with vague goals, requiring large amounts of 
change, and without oversight or monitoring were found (Bullock and Lamb, 
1984) Absence of requisite technology was cited as a factor thwarting 
successful implementation, but successful implementation of programs 
where technology needed to be invented to carry out the program were 
found (Wanat, 1974). Conclusions and finds in the implementation 
literature are confusing and contradictory. Often these finds are based on 
studies of implementation of programs and policy during the frrst few years 
after legislation was enacted. We suggest that a longer time-frame may 
unravel some of the contradictions in the current implementation literature. 
The question of the appropriate time-frame is an important question 
in policy implementation research. At any point in time, what we look a t  as 
policy is a narrow slice of a continuous stream (Jones, 1984). Most case 
studies used to test models of implementation concentrate on 
implementation in progress. That is, the time frame used is short when 
compared with the decades often required to stabilize patterns of behavior 
after some perturbation (e.g., legislation, crisis, technological innovation) 
disrupts the status quo. 
In this study we explore implementation models across time to see 
how well they predict and explain completed implementation processes. To 
test whether current models of implementation help explain and predict 
completed policy implementation and policy implementation from a different 
time period, we turned to the progressive era and chose the first federal 
child labor law. There is substantial similarity between the Great Society 
Programs and the reforms sought during the progressive era. Both focus on 
issues of poverty and inequality. Both attack practices embedded in and 
maintained by economic structures. We feel these similarities provide a 
context in which we can risk tentative generalizing about performance of 
models across time and on importance of different variables in completed 
processes of policy implementation. 
We examine two models here: one developed by Sabatier and 
Mazmanian and one developed by Nakamura and Smallwood. We contrast 
these two models with the traditional model of implementation to provide 
perspective on the advantages offered by these two models and indicate why 
they developed. 
Tradit 
. . Model of ional Implementation: 
Many models of policy implementation focus heavily on attributes of 
legislation as predictors of implementation. We call these models rational 
models of public policy implementation. Rational models of implementation 
adopt a machine model of organizations and view decision-making as a 
rational process. The focus of policy implementation in these models is on 
clear, concise, consistent goals set forth by law-makers in statutes and 
applied by administrators in programs. Bureaucrats charged with 
administering programs correspond to Weberian ideal-type career 
bureaucrats impartially applying rules set forth by law-makers. Following 
the Wilsonian tradition, separation of administration from formulation of 
policy is clear-cut and distinct (Wilson, 1887). In the tradition of Frederick 
Taylor, eficiency measures successful program administration. In the 
rational model of public policy implementation, administration is the only 
process involved in implementation. This perspective on implementation 
views interest groups as a source of perturbation forcing accommodation and 
particularistic application of rules. Rational models of public policy 
implementation assume groups affected by policy can be made to comply 
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with statutes as long as intent is clearly specified and bureaucrats follow 
rules laid down for them. Programs are evaluated to determine whether 
goals have been met. If statutory goals are met, then implementation is 
successful. The more eficiently goals are met, the more successful the 
implementation. 
Empirical and theoretical work of political scientists and organization 
theorists challenges foundations of the rational model of policy 
implementation (Rourke, 1978; Lewis, 1977; Present, 1979; Bardach, 1977). 
Bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) challenges assumptions based on rational 
decision-making in public policy. The notion of dominant coalitions (Cyert 
and March, 1963) challenges the assumption of clear, consistent goals. 
Political compromise leads to ambiguous goals in legislation (Nakamura and 
Smallwood, 1980; Lewis, 1977). Statutes are often based on faulty causal 
logic. Educational reform bills, a classic example (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 
1983), may specify that improved curriculum materials be provided to 
schools to achieve higher student educational achievement. Yet the link 
between curriculum materials and educational achievement is not clearly 
established. Statutes requiring use of technology not yet developed (i.e., the 
1970 Clean Air Act) also fail to meet assumptions of the rational model of 
implementation. 
Since policy-makers are often elected officials, impact of interest 
groups on policy implementation is intertwined with law-makers' 
responsiveness to constituents (Lewis, 1977). Law-makers thus become a 
conduit for interest group perturbations disrupting impartial application of 
rules by bureaucrats. 
Communication between constituents and law-makers and between 
law-makers and bureaucrats is often ambiguous and incomplete. 
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Information economics leads us to believe that information is costly. 
Dysfunctional communication is often exacerbated by bureaucratic 
complexity with multiple hierarchical levels in which responsibility is diffuse 
and multiple decision points militate against action (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973). 
Allison's analysis of the Cuban Missile crisis contrasts the rational- 
actor model of decision-making with organizational and bureaucratic models. 
His work raised awareness of interaction among government agencies 
involved in decision-making. Interaction between agencies affects both 
decision-making and ways decisions are, or are not, carried out (Allison, 
1969). 
Models of public policy implementation developed during the 1970's 
attempt to integrate advances in organization theory and in decision-making 
with the rational model of public policy implementation. We examine two 
of these models here. 
Mazmanian and Sabatier s Model; - 9 
Mazmanian and Sabatier advance a model of public policy 
implementation that includes 16 independent variables: 
-seven related to "ability of the statute to structure implementation" 
clear, consistent objectives; 
adequate causal theory; 
financial resources; 
hierarchical integration within and among implementing institutions; 
decision rules of implementing agencies; 
recruitment of implementing officials; 
formal access by outsiders 
-four to "tractability of the problem" 
technical dfliculties; 
diversity of target group behavior; 
target group as a percent of population; 
extent of behavioral change 
-and five to "nonstatutory variables affecting implementation" 
socioeconomic conditions and technology; 
public support; 
attitudes and resources of constituency groups; 
support from sovereigns; 
commitment and leadership skill of implementing officials 
(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983, p. 22). 
These are linked to five dependent variables or stages in the implementation 
process: 
outputs of implementing agencies, 
compliance of target groups, 
actual impacts of policy outputs, 
perceived impacts of policy outputs and 
major revision in the statute. 
While variables measuring statutory structuring of implementation reflect 
the rational model of policy implementation, nonstatutory variables 
incorporate other environmental and political factors influencing 
8 
implementation. Tractability variables measure technological, behavioral 
and political difficulties of 
implementation. 
Variables in the model are distilled into six criteria which the authors 
use to evaluate success of public policy 
implementation. The six criteria appear below: 
1. The statute contains clear and consistent policy directives. 
2. The statute incorporates sound theory identifying factors affecting 
program goals and gives implementing officials sufficient jurisdiction to 
attain those objectives. 
3. The statute structures implementation to maximize the 
probability of compliance from implementing officials and target groups. 
4. Top implementing officials are strongly committed to attainment of 
statutory objectives and have the skills necessary to ensure achievement of 
the goals. 
5. The program is actively supported by organized constituency groups 
and a few key sovereigns (legislative or executive) throughout the 
implementation process. 
6. Changing socioeconomic conditions over time do not weaken the 
statute's causal theory or political support nor the priority of statutory 
objectives. 
(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). 
While this model incorporates assumptions of the traditional model of 
implementation (i.e., that goals and legislation are the driving force behind 
implementation and that implementation is a "transmission belt" process), 
political and socioeconomic factors are also considered. 
Nakamura and Smallwood's Model: 
An alternative model of policy implementation, presented by 
Nakamura and Smallwood, posits three policy arenas each occupied by 
groups of actors: policy formulators, policy implementors and policy 
implementation evaluators. Actors in these arenas are linked to each other 
by relationships characterized by five different scenarios: classical 
technocracy, instructed delegation, bargaining, discretionary 
experimentation and bureaucratic entrepreneurship. Relationships between 
policy makers and policy implementors vary with each scenario on three 
criteria: 
1) degree of goal specificity provided by policy formulators, 
2) the nature of tasks delegated to policy implementors, and 
3) amount of control implementors and formulators exercise over each 
other. 
The model provides five evaluation criteria suggested for evaluation of policy 
outcomes: goal attainment, efficiency, constituency satisfaction, clientele 
responsiveness, and system maintenance. Each evaluation criterion is more 
likely to be relevant to a specific relationship or scenario involving policy 
formulators and policy implementors (the five scenarios listed above). The 
attached diagrams (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980, pp. 1 14-1 15, 153) 
summarize these relationships. 
Differences in relationships among the same categories of actors are 
important in this model. In fact, the model describes five different types of 
relationships between policy makers and policy implementors. The model 
assumes there will be negotiation and bargaining over goals during the 
implementation process. This model incorporates criterion for success other 
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than efficiency in meeting goals. Using scenarios encourages us to look 
beyond the individual statute. This model resolves even more challenges 
leveled a t  the rational model of policy implementation than does the 
1 
Mazmanian and Sabatier model. The Nakamura and Smallwood model, 
however, lacks specific variables to focus investigation. 
CASE STUDY 
Application of these models to the first national child-labor law (the 
1916 Keating-Owen bill) and to early development of child labor policy will 
test robustness of these models. As noted earlier, this particular statute 
was chosen because it parallels in many ways War on Poverty legislation 
which gave birth to these two models. 
Brief Historv of National Child Labor Legislation: 
Employment of children has a long history intertwined with beliefs 
that child labor prevents female promiscuity and juvenile delinquency. 
Putting children to work kept them out poor houses and prevented idle 
fingers from engaging in the "devil's work." Many parents relied on meager 
income provided by children to help support the family. This was, however, 
a vicious cycle of poverty, since child labor depressed wages and hence 
undermined adults' ability to earn adequate incomes. Child labor was both 
a cause and an effect of poverty. During the 19th century, employers 
profited from child labor and many employers, as well as  parents, fought 
tenaciously to prevent its regulation. 
As early as 1867, Massachusetts instituted the first factory 
inspections to regulate child labor, but subsequent progress was slow. By 
1890 only thirteen states had some form of child labor legislation. The 1890 
, . 
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Census showed that 18% (1,500,000) of the nation's children age 10 to 15 
were gainfully employed. 
The Progressive Era aroused social consciousness on many issues, 
including child labor. Those concerned were motivated by compassion for 
the plight of child laborers and by a concern for the future of the nation. If 
children were working, they were not in school and hence not receiving 
knowledge and skills needed by future citizens. I t  appears that i t  is no 
coincidence Massachusetts had both the first child' labor legislation and the 
first compulsory school attendance legislation. (A 1836 Massachusetts Law 
required that children under 15 attend school three months per year.) 
Accident rates were much higher for child laborers than for adults in the 
same industries (e.g., 133% higher in the textile industry). Killing and 
maiming children decreases the future pool of adult workers, so employing 
children wasted future adult labor. Children could be viewed as a national 
resource--a resource threatened by child labor. 
During the early 1900's state committees to investigate the extent 
and impact of child labor proliferated. The New York Child Labor 
Committee was the most active of these. In 1902, the Pennsylvania 
anthracite coal strike publicized the desperate plight of children working in 
mines and fueled sentiment against the practice. 
In 1904 the National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) was established 
through efforts of the New York Child Labor Committee. The National 
Consumer's League provided ofices for the new NCLC and letters 
requesting donations raised $8,000 in the first few weeks. Membership in 
the NCLC was broadly based and non-partisan. Of the 46 members, one- 
third were Southerners and one-third were New Yorkers. Members 
included social workers, church leaders, labor leaders, businessmen, bankers, 
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lawyers, educators and government officials. The NCLC investigated child 
labor conditions, publicized problems and sponsored state-level legislation to 
reduce child labor. The NCLC targeted Pennsylvania for its first 
investigation. More than 10,000 ten to fourteen-year-old children were 
found working illegally in mines, despite a state statute prohibiting mine 
work for children under fourteen years old. The only proof of age required 
under the Pennsylvania law was a parent's affidavit and, since parents 
often lied about the child's age, the law was virtually useless. 
Increasing public support and government recognition for NCLC 
during this time show concern about child labor gaining legitimacy. By 
1906 NCLC membership exceeded 98 1 associate members (those 
contributing between $2 and $25). In 1907 a special act of Congress 
incorporated NCLC and by 1909 membership had risen to 5,000 associate 
members. 
In 1906 Representative Beveridge of Indiana introduced a bill in 
Congress using federal regulation of interstate commerce to restrict child 
labor. Firms operating in states with strong child labor legislation were a t  a 
competitive disadvantage with firms in the same industry located in states 
with weak child labor legislation. This provided impetus for Congressional 
action. At this time NCLC members split on whether to support national 
legislation. The AFL opposed national child labor legislation fearing 
government interference in labor. President Roosevelt questioned the 
constitutionality of the bill. 
By 19 12, however, NCLC supported national child labor legislation. 
The transformation came about as NCLC acknowledged, that despite its 
efforts to obtain new and improved state legislation, implementation of state 
laws was neglected. Factory inspections were virtually non-existent. Since 
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state inspectors were often political appointees of state officials who relied 
on factory owners for election support, laws simply were not enforced. 
NCLC thought federal-level legislation might encourage states to meet 
minimum standards in their own legislation and would enhance 
enforcement. 
In 1912 the Children's Bureau was created and placed in the 
Department of Commerce and Labor. In 1913, when Labor became a 
separate department, the Children's Bureau was transferred to the 
Department of Labor. The head of the Children's Bureau, Julia Lathrop, 
was chosen by NCLC. NCLC also had impact on the Progressive Party 
platform of 19 12. In 19 13, two bills designed to regulate child labor in 
businesses which engaged in interstate commerce were introduced in 
Congress, one by Rep. Copley and the other by Sen. Kenyon. NCLC 
evaluated both bills and rejected Copley's based on a clause defining 
violators as employers who had knowingly violated the law. NCLC felt this 
would make the law impossible to enforce. The Kenyon bill did not meet 
NCLC minimum standards, so NCLC decided to submit its own bill. 
The NCLC bill specified that for firms engaging in interstate 
commerce, no children less than 14 years old could work in factories, no 
children less than 16 years old could work in mines or quarries, and the 
maximum work day for children under. 16 was limited to 8 hours with no 
work between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. The law designated employers of children 
rather than carriers of goods produced by employers using child labor as 
violators. In 1915, NCLC used Rep. Palmer and Sen. Owen to sponsor the 
bill. The House passed the bill 233 to 43. The Senate, which was near the 
end of the year, let the bill die. In 1916, NCLC had Rep. Keating and Sen. 
Owen sponsor the same bill. This time the House passed the bill 343 to 46. 
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Sen. Overman of North Carolina, who cast the one dissenting vote 
preventing the bill from reaching the floor in 1915, almost succeeded in 
blocking the bill again. However, NCLC's McKelvey convinced Pres. Wilson 
that, if he did not adopt some reform measures in the Democratic Party 
platform, he would surely lose the election. Wilson promised in the platform 
that national child labor legislation would be passed, called Democratic 
Senators to the White House to let them know his wishes and refused to 
accept the nomination until Democratic Senators agreed to pass the 
Keating-Owen bill. The bill passed in Sept., 1916. 
On Sept. 1, 1917 the bill took effect. In anticipation, laws designed to 
meet the national standard passed in six states. States, particularly those 
in the south (which had the weakest laws prior to Keating-Owen) wanted to 
establish their own standards to discourage federal interference in their 
affairs. 
Soon after the bill became law, a case contrived by North Carolina 
mill owners to test the constitutionality of the law, was brought before 
Judge Boyd in the Federal Court of the Western Judicial District of North 
Carolina. Judge Boyd ruled the law unconstitutional based on fathers' 5th 
Amendment rights to profit from their children's labor. The law remained 
in effect in the rest of the states and in the other judicial districts in North 
Carolina during the appeal to the Supreme Court. It was generally 
assumed that the Supreme Court would uphold the law, but in June, 1918 
. in a 5 to 4 decision the Court ruled that the law was an unconstitutional 
infringement on states' rights. 
As Table 1 indicates, after the Supreme Court struck down the 
federal statute, child labor rates rose again. The data for this table are 
based on inspections by government inspectors during the nine months in 
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which the Keating-Owen law was in effect and inspections during the 10 
months immediately after the Supreme Court overturned Keating-Owen. 
The table includes information on the number of establishments inspected, 
the number of establishments in which violations were found and the 
percentage of establishments inspected in which violations were found. 
State laws were often weaker than the Keating-Owen standard. The table 
also includes information on violations of state laws reported by the federal 
inspectors. Individual states selected for inclusion in this table had a t  least 
10 establishments inspected in both time periods. 
TABLE 1 
Number of Establishments Inspected Found Violating Keating-Owen 
(note that many state statutes were not as strong as Keating-Owen) 
911117-6/3/18 6/3/18-4/24/19 613118-4/24/19 
(during Keating-Owen) (after Keating-Owen) (state laws) 
v i o l a t o r s  j.nspct X y i o l a t o r s  i n s ~ c t  X v i o l a t o r s  
All 48 States 293 689 43 736 1187 62 561 47 
Florida 7 14 50 11 15 73 8 53 
New Jersey 5 14 36 13 32 41 13 41 
N. Carolina 50 109 46 52 ' - 53 98 47 87 
Rhode Island 16 20 80 24 37 65 4 11 
S. Carolina 19 64 30 24 24 100 2 8 
Virginia 26 57 46 96 103 93 74 72 
While implementation of Keating-Owen halted, attempts to reduce 
child labor through federal action did not. In July of 1918, Felix 
Frankfurter, head of the War Labor Policies Board, added a clause to all 
federal contracts enforcing the Keating- Owen standards for all companies 
with federal contracts. The standard applied to all military bases and 
reservations by order of the Adjutant General. In August 1918 inclusion of 
the Keating-Owen standards in the war powers act was attempted. This 
effort did not get through Congress before the end of the war. Clearly, 
regulation of child labor had achieved legitimacy, and the particulars of 
regulation specified in Keating-Owen constituted the standard. 
In November of 1918, NCLC began drafting an amendment to the 
1918 &venue Bill to tax employers not meeting Keating-Owen Standards. 
Sen. Pomerene introduced a similar bill of his. own in which all employers 
not meeting the Keating-Owen standards would be subject to a 10% tax on 
all their profits. The NCLC decided to support Pomerene's bill which passed 
in February, 1919. In May, 1919, North Carolina mill owners again tested 
the constitutionality of the law in Judge Boyd's court. Judge Boyd, without 
even hearing all the arguments in the case, announced his decision--the law 
was unconstitutional. Again the Supreme Court was expected to uphold the 
law. 
The 1920 census reported 8.4% of children 10 to 15 years old 
(1,000,000 children) gainfully employed compared to 18.4% (2,000,000 
children) reported gainfully employed in the 19 10 census. 
TABLE 2 
Census Data for Employed Children Ages 10 and 15 
W no. of children percentage of 
emlsloved h l d r e n  employed 
The number of 10 to 15 year-olds in the population increased by 15.5% 
during the decade between 1910 and 1920, while the number of children 10 
to 15 years old gainfully employed decreased by 46.7%. It  appears that this 
reduction in employment of children can be attributed to the federal 
legislative activity of the decade, including both Keating-Owen and the 1919 
&venue Bill. As Table 3 (below) shows, child labor rose in areas 
unregulated by the federal statutes and decreased in those covered during 
the latter part of the decade by federal laws. Use of child employees 
declined substantially in manufacturing and mining, both of which produce 
goods transported across state boundaries. Additionally, total employment 
in manufacturing and mining increased during this period, so the reduction 
in child labor is not an artifact of an industry-wide slump. 
TABLE 3 
Changes in Employment of Children between 1910 and 1920 
Area of Emlslovment ~ I Q J E u ! ~  10-13 yrs. All Employees 
(includes adults) 
Covered by State Laws Only 
Clerical 12.9% -4.6% 80.0% 
Public Service 110.4% 142.9% 67.8% 
Covered by State & Federal Laws 
Manufacturing -29.0% -71.0% 20.6% 
Mines -60.0% -72.6% 13.0% 
In May 1922, the Supreme Court in an 8 to 1 decision ruled the 1919 
Revenue Act unconstitutional. By 1923 only 13 states had statutes which 
met the Keating-Owen Standards. The work day for many child laborers 
exceeded 8 hours and industries in states with strong child labor laws began 
migrating to states with weaker child labor laws. 
As is well known, efforts to regulate child labor continued. The Fair 
Labor Standards Act, whose child labor provisions were almost identical to 
Keating-Owen, was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1938. Like Keating- 
Owen, the Fair Labor Standards Act, which is also known as the Wages and 
Hours Act, restricts employment of child labor in goods shipped across state 
boundaries. There is no other federal regulation of child labor. 
Further chapters in the fight against child labor are beyond the scope 
of this paper, but obviously the Keating-Owen effort had impact. While 
there is still room for improvement in child labor regulation, (e.g., among 
migrant farm laborers), current child labor in this country differs 
dramatically from child labor a t  the turn of the century. All but two of our 
fifty states prohibit full-time industrial employment for children under 14 
years. Six states have laws which establish 15 years as the minimum age 
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for full-time employment. For children under 16 years, hours of 
employment are limited to eight hours per day and a maximum work week 
of 48 hours in 25 states. Twelve other states have laws that establish these 
restrictions on hours, but have loopholes that allow serious exceptions. Four 
other states further limit the work week to a 44 hour maximum. 
If we look at a overview of the progress from the first state statutes 
to the acceptance of federal legislation, we gain perspective on policy 
implementation as a long-term process. 
Ch r n l  o o ogy of Progress in Ch il d Labor Legislat ion 
1842 Connecticut and Massachusetts limit workday of children in textile 
factories to 10 hours 
1848 Pennsylvania prohibits employment of children under 12 in mills 
1867 Massachusetts institutes first factory inspections to enforce child labor 
regulations 
1870 Census provides first reliable statistics on child labor (only for 
children 10 years and older) 
1890 Thirteen states had some child labor legislation 
1900 Half the states had some form of child labor legislation, but only ten 
states attempted to enforce their child labor laws 
1904 National Child Labor Committee Established 
1912 Children's Bureau created 
19 16 Keating-Owen became law 
19 17 Keating-Owen took effect 
1918 Keating-Owen declared unconstitutional 
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1919 Revenue Act imposes a 10% tax on profits of firnls not meeting 
Keating-Owen standards for child labor 
1922 Revenue Act of 19 19 declared unconstitutional 
1924 Congress proposes a constitutional amendment to prohibit child labor 
(The amendment has never been ratified by enough states) 
1933 National Recovery Act (NRA) contained provisions against child labor 
(The NRA was declared unconstitutional) 
1936 Public Contracts Act establishes minimum age of 16 for boys and 18 
for girls for firms with federal contracts 
1938 Fair Labor Standards Act included provisions to restrict child labor on 
goods transported across state boundaries. (This act was upheld by the 
Supreme Court) 
1948 Amendment to Fair Labor Standards Act prohibits children from 
engaging in farm labor during school hours 
1974 Amendment to Fair Labor Standards Act prohibits employment of 
children under 12 on farms using 500 or more man-days of labor per 
quarter and requires written permission from the parents of children 12 and 
13 years old employed on farms of this size (Upheld by the Supreme Court) 
G . . h eneral Provisions o f t  e Keating-Owen St&ute: 
The law provided "That no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall 
ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce any article or 
commodity the product of any mine or quarry, situated in the United States, 
in which within thirty days prior to the time of the removal of such product 
therefrom children under the age of sixteen years have been employed or 
permitted to work, or any article or commodity the product of any mill, 
cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment, situated in the 
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United States, in which within thirty days prior to the removal of such 
product therefrom children under the age of fourteen years have been 
employed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of fourteen 
years and sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work more 
than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the 
hour of seven o'clock postmeridian, or before the hour of six o'clock 
antemeridian . . . " (Public--no. 249--64th Congress). 
Inspections to enforce the act were authorized. Prosecution of 
violations by district attorneys was required. Fines for first offenses were 
not to exceed $200 and penalties for subsequent offenses could range 
between $100 to $1000 and could also be punished by imprisonment of 
three months or less. Shippers, who received written guarantee that no 
prohibited child labor had occurred during the 30 days prior to removal of 
the product, were safe from prosecution. Employers with certificates on file 
verifying the age of child laborers were safe from prosecution, as long as 
they dismissed children whose certificates were revoked. In qualified states, 
state certificates carried the same force as federal certificates. The statute 
established a Child-Labor Board, comprised of the Attorney General and the 
Secretaries of Labor and Commerce, "to make and publish from time to 
time uniform rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of this 
act." The complete statute appears in Appendix A. 
The rules and regulations made by the Child-Labor Board covered 
information required on cerMcates of age, type of documentation of age 
required to issue certificates, authorization and acceptance of state 
certificates, process for and effect of suspending or revoking certificates, 
computation of hours of employment, days of employment, time record 
requirements for laborers between the ages of 14 and 16, inspections, 
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implications of obstructing inspections, a definition of what constituted 
removal of goods, and forms for guarantees provided to shippers. The 
oficial publication of the rules and regulations appears in Appendix B. 
Implementation of the 19 16 Keating-Owen Statute; 
Grace Abbott, (of Hull House fame) was appointed director of the 
Child-Labor Division of the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor. 
According to the Secretary of Labor, she established a cooperative 
relationship between the states and the Federal agency. State cooperation 
reduced confusion and contradictory requirements from administering both 
state and federal statutes. The Department of Labor Children's Bureau, in 
which the Child-Labor Division was located, conducted research on 
administration of state child labor laws and understood how legislation could 
be thwarted. Incremental progress was expected and did not cause overly 
pessimistic appraisal. The Department of Labor requested $200,840 to 
implement the law the first year. (The budget request appears in Appendix 
C.) Congress appropriated $150,000. 
The Child-Labor Board designated an advisory board consisting of the 
Assistant Secretaries of Labor and Commerce and a juvenile court judge to 
assist in formulating the rules and regulations. A year lead time between 
passage of the law and enforcement of the law, specified in the statute, 
provided time to develop rules and regulations for implementation and to 
allow employers to conform to the legislation. 
Certification of age was the most crucial aspect of implementation. 
Many states already had laws and procedures for certifying the age of child 
laborers. In February, 1917, the board sent a letter to governors in each 
state advising them of the standards governing child labor used to produce 
23 
goods transported across state lines or out of the country. This letter 
advised governors that, to avoid the costs and confusion of certifying 
children for work under the federal statute and certifying the children under 
state statutes (double certifying), states should raise their standards to the 
level of the federal standard. States whose laws met the minimum standard 
could rely on their own system of certification and would be granted the 
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right to conduct their own inspections of establishments. Six states did 
pass, during the year before the law took effect, legislation to raise their 
certification standards to meet the federal guidelines. Other states 
designated administrative boards which had the power to comply with 
federal certification standards. Initially, only five states: North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi and Virginia were denied the 
prerogative of managing the certification process themselves. However, had 
the law continued in effect some of the states initially granted the privilege 
would have had i t  withdrawn. States had to regularly re-apply for 
permission to issue certificates. In July of 1917, two months before the law 
took effect, public meetings were held to discuss the statute and seek input 
from state officials and employers. Tentative rules and regulations were 
presented a t  these meetings. Issues raised at these public meetings 
included: 1. the person to whom the certificate should be issued--It was 
decided that the certificate would be issued to the child, but the child would 
need an intent to employ card from a prospective employer in order to apply 
for certification. Officials discussed issuing the certificates to employers 
since this would help schools keep track of children. The problem of 
employers not returning certificates when children quit or changed jobs 
made this idea undesirable. Employers were, however, required to keep the 
certificates on file. 2. whether to issue certificates to 16-year-olds--Based on 
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the costs involved, officials decided to issue certificates only to 16-year-olds 
working in mines and quarries. During the nine months it was in effect, 
those charged with implementing the Keating-Owen bill became convinced 
of the need to issue certificates to all 16-year-olds. 3. what would constitute 
acceptable proof of age--A ranked list of documents specified several sources 
of proof. If the first document on the list was not available then the second 
would be accepted and so on. The list in order of preference included: birth 
certificate, baptismal certificate, bible record, life insurance policy, other 
documentary evidence and physician's certificate of physical age combined 
with parent's statement and school record. 
There were many problems with certification that arose from the 
proof of age documentation. In the past parents' affidavits had proved 
highly unreliable. Attempts by parents to alter or present false documents 
proliferated under the new regulations. Birth ~ e r t ~ c a t e s  were rarely 
available. The family Bible was the main source of documentation. Many 
cases in which the Bible records appeared to be altered were cited by 
officials. Certificates were not given to children in these instances. Life 
insurance, commonly purchased to insure the child would receive a decent 
burial, proved a poor source of age documentation. Life insurance 
companies would "correct" the child's age on the policy on request by the 
parents. School records were often the best source, but were hard to obtain. 
Issuing officers learned more ways to obtain school records the longer they 
were on the job. In some instances, particularly in mill towns, the mill 
provided more than half the funds for the school and determined who would 
serve on the school board. In these cases school officials were sometimes 
threatened with dismissal if they provided accurate records of age. 
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The physician's evaluation was nothing more than height and weight. 
In establishing the regulations, the board considered the possibility of using 
puberty as an indicator, but rejected the idea since the examination would 
be too personal. Development of teeth was too variable to be useful. The 
cutoff points for height and weight were arbitrarily determined since good 
data about average height and weight for children in the communities 
affected did not exist. The criterion was 56 inches and 80 pounds for 14 
year-olds and 57 inches and 85 pounds for 16 year-olds. Exceptions could be 
made down to 54 inches and 75 pounds for 14 year-olds and 56 inches and 
80 pounds for 16 year- olds. School records often contradicted the 
physician's estimate of age. 
During the nine months the law was in effect, federal officials 
reviewed 25,330 applications for certificates in the five states in which they 
were responsible for certification. Officials issued 19,696 certificates. . 
During August, 1917, state officers contacted employers and inspected 
records to determine whether certificates currently on file were adequate. 
Federal officers submitted to Washington duplicate copies of certificates 
issued. 
In the five states in which federal officials certified children: North 
and South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi and Virginia, after the first flood 
of applicants, inspection districts were arranged so an inspector could reach 
each mill town once a month. These five states were "chosen" for federal 
intervention based on their weak statutes and poor record of enforcement. 
North Carolina had very low standards. The state commissioner had no 
funding for inspections and no right of entry. Georgia had low standards 
and one inspector for the entire state. Mississippi had low standards and no 
penalties for canneries who violated state laws. South Carolina had 
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recently raised the state standards and was much more cooperative than the 
other states in this group. Virginia was originally not one of the chosen 
few, but performed so poorly during the first six months that the state was 
denied authority to issue certificates when it was time for states to re-apply. 
There were additional problems when states were responsible for 
certification. In most states, local oficials--often school superintendents-- 
were responsible for issuing certifications and verifying documentation. 
Sometimes local officials sold certificates. Sometime school superintendents 
delegated responsibility for certification to clerical or custodial personnel. 
The problem was worse in the summer, when school superintendents were 
out of town. State commissioners had no authority over school 
superintendents and so could not prevent this practice. The quality of 
certification depended on the person doing the certifying and varied wide 
between neighboring communities. One public meeting, attended by state 
commissioners and chief factory inspectors from 28 states and the District of 
Columbia, focused on rules and regulations for inspections. Those attending 
wanted federal recognition as inspectors. They received it. This meant an 
inspection could be initiated by either states or by the Child-Labor Division 
and that state inspectdrs could search records for evidence of shipment 
across state or national boundaries. In return state officials provided 
education and information to employers and parents prior to the law taking 
effect. One inspector from the Child-Labor Division coordinated federal and 
state inspection activities. Initially, joint inspections were conducted to 
acquaint each level with the other's work and to impress upon employers 
state support for the federal legislation. State officials were trained to 
obtain proof that goods had been shipped interstate. Federal inspectors 
checked to see whether allowing states to issue certificates worked. (As 
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discussed above, in many cases it did not work.) The state and federal 
officials shared the work of inspections and shared information. 
A general plan for inspections during the first year targeted the most 
important child-employing industries (limited to those engaging in interstate 
commerce) in states with the lowest standards. Low standards arose either 
from weak legislation or from thwarted enforcement. Inspections were 
unannounced. 
In mines, mine inspectors were often responsible for child labor 
inspections. On the surface this appeared to be a reasonable conservation of 
resources, but in practice the mine inspectors did not have enough time to 
check certificates. Mines are checked inside the mine; age certificates are 
check outside the mine. Mine inspectors were skilled in engineering, not in 
document checking. 
Postponement of the civil service act delayed the starting date for 
inspections. Despite the delay, during the short life of the bill 639 
manufacturing inspections were conducted in 24 states and the District of 
Columbia and 28 mine inspections were conducted in 4 states. 293 
inspected establishments had violated the law. 
The statute specified fines for a first offense that were more lenient 
than fines for subsequent offenses. While the law was in effect eight 
employers plead guilty and were fined as follows: 1 - $50; 3 - $100; 1 - 
$150; 2 - $160; 1 - $300. Seventeen other cases were pending and 21 cases 
had been sent to the Justice Department with recommendations to 
prosecute. 
After the law was declared unconstitutional, the Child-Labor Division 
continued conducting inspections. There were two justifications for these 
inspections. First, conducting research on child labor practices was part of 
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the general mission of the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor. 
Inspectors provided data for this research. Second, after Keating-Owen was 
overturned government contracts required Keating-Owen standards for 
businesses involved in these contracts. Inspectors provided information used 
to enforce this clause. Federal inspectors shared results of these inspections 
with state oficials and continued to provide additional indicators of the 
impact of Keating-Owen. The results of the inspections conducted after 
June, 1918 are summarized below. 
Pennsylvania had requirements for certification that were equivalent 
to the federal standard, but implementation was not uniform. Conditions 
were particularly bad in the mines. 
In Alabama the state commissioner did not investigate any 
certification records supplied by superintendents. The Federal Child-Labor 
Inspector estimated that less than 50% of the children working in Alabama 
had proper certificates. After the June, 19 18 Supreme 'Court decision, 
superintendents began granting certificates exempting children from the 
state law. 
In Florida many employers were unaware of or ignored certification 
requirements. As a result of the federal inspections a lot of employers sent 
their child employees to be certified. Establishments paying piecework rates 
kept no time records. As a result of federal inspections, 7 cigar factories 
were prosecuted by state inspectors. 
Kentucky passed a new law in 1918 that equalled the federal 
standard. School superintendents were unknowingly violating the law. 
Manufacturers understood the law better than the superintendents, but 
thought the superintendent's signature would prevent prosecution. After 
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learning of this problem, the state commissioner provided more information 
for superintendents. 
In Maryland, 42.9% of the children employed in the canneries were 
younger than the state limit--14 years. Here again, piecework meant that 
there were no time sheets. Physicians did not want to certify age and did 
not support the law. 
In Massachusetts certificates were filled out in pencil so they were 
easy to alter. No documentation was required for certification. Inspectors 
found 2,375 children younger than 16 working in Massachusetts. Of these 
221 had no certificate and 192 had invalid certificates. 
New York was an example of success. The state law was stronger 
than the federal standard. Children younger than 18 could not work hours 
other than those between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. Documentation of age required 
the proof used to enforce Keating-Owen, except that two. physician's 
statements were required, with a third physician consulted if the first two 
did not agree. Only 3 children under 14 were found working and 31 
between the ages of 14 and 16 were found working more than 8 hourslday. 
There was one flaw in the state law. It  lacked provisions to revoke 
certificates if better evidence of age was found. State inspectors conducted 
routine periodic inspections. 
North Carolina fell a t  the opposite end of the spectrum. After June, 
1918, inspectors found 622 children under 14 working. (The state minimum 
was 13). 91 of these 622 were under ten years old. Three establishments 
were inspected both while the statute was in effect and after June, 1918. 
The results show: 
Before June, 1918 Establishment 1: no violations 
Establishment 2: no violations 
After June, 19 18 
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Establishment 3: 1 child working under age 
Establishment 1: 17 children working under age; 
15 children working long hrs. 
Establishment 2: 8 children working under age; 
14 children working long hrs. 
Establishment 3: 25 children working under age; 
49 children working long hrs. 
It should be kept in mind that not all violations of the federal standards 
were violations of the weak North Carolina statute. 
Ohio had the strongest state law. It  was passed in 1913, three years 
before Keating-Owen. Lack of supervision of certificate issuing caused 
violations. Inspectors found no children employed in violation of the federal 
standards, but 327 were employed in violation of the Ohio law. There were 
also problems with children who lived close to the border of West Virginia 
crossing over the border to work a t  night. 
In Virginia the state commissioner requested joint state and federal 
inspections after June, 1918. In factory inspections 3 1 children under 14 
were found working and 572 children between 14 and 16 were found 
working 9 to 10 hour days. In the canneries, inspectors found 319 children 
under 14 working. Of these 130 were under 12 years old. No certificates 
were on file in the canneries inspected. The state law covered canneries, 
but did not provide penalties for violations by canneries. 
One can only gain an impression of practices and conditions from the 
report of these inspections because the size of the establishments is not 
given. I t  is s i d i c a n t  however that federal and state cooperation in 
inspections continued after the statute was gone. Recall that NCLC's 
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justification for supporting national legislation was improved enforcement of 
state statutes through federal involvement. 
Evaluation Based on the Mazmanian and Sabatier Model; 
Using the 16 independent variables linked to the dependent variables 
yields the following picture: 
1. Lechnical difficulties: lack of reliable documents made certification of age 
d=cult and inaccurate 
2. diversitv of target group behavior; low - range of behaviors was narrow. 
(4 types of employment practices) and could be specified 
3. h r e e t  group as a percent of o~ulation; large - child labor practices 
prohibited by the statute were widespread 
4. extent of behavioral change. high - costly for employers to dismiss cheap 
child laborers and many parents wanted children to work 
5. statute contains clear, consistent oblecti . . ves; yes - regulation of child 
labor in the establishments producing goods for interstate transport (It 
must be noted however that the real goal of having national legislation, 
better enforcement of state statutes and a minimum standard for all child 
laborers, not just those employed by makers of goods transported across 
state lines, was not and could not constitutionally be included in the 
statute.) 
6. statute incorporates adequate causal theory; yes - Penalizing employers 
and certifying children had been shown a t  the state-level to reduce child 
labor. 
. . .  
7. ~nitial allocation of financial resources; given $50,000 or 25% less than 
requested for the first year 
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8. hierarchical integration within & among implementing institutions: 
excellent, with one exception--the Supreme Court - cooperative relationships 
were established between the states and the Child Labor Division; 
cooperation between the Justice, Commerce and Labor Departments 
appears to have been good; placement in the Children's Bureau provided 
supportive parent agency 
9. dec . . ision rules of implementing a~encies: very good - carefully developed 
rules with input from multiple sources; mandate provided flexibility to 
revise rules as necessary 
10. recruitment of implementing off icial L - very good - favorable to statute 
and broader goals of reducing child labor in general - Grace Abbott was well 
qualified and sympathetic to goals 
11. formal access bv outsiders: good - cooperative relationships with state 
oEcials and state child labor commissions, NCLC; 
12. SOC' . . ioeconomic conditions and technolo~\r; unfavorable - the war 
increased demand for child labor, yet state officials reported that despite the 
a war state statutes were easier to enforce than they had been prior to the 
law and the war 
. 13. public support: mixed - very high among most of the upper and middle 
class, although this ero,ded some during the war - very low among lower 
class (parents of child laborers) and among employers of child labor 
14. attitudes and resources of constituencv -0- good - NCLC and other 
state child labor committees had some resources and very supportive 
15. support of sovereipns: good - many legislators were sympathetic and 
sponsored bills drafted by NCLC; McKelvey's contact with Wilson resulted 
in passage of the bill 
16. commitment and leadership skill of im~lementing officials; excellent 
Summarizing the impressions provided above, it appears that tractability of 
the problem was low, ability of statute to structure implementation was 
good and non-statutory impacts were favorable. The independent variables 
affect the dependent variables in this model as indicated in Figure 1 below: 
FIGURE 1 - 
Variables: Tractability of Problem (variables 1-4) 
/ 
Ability of Statute 
\ 
Nonstatutory Variables 
to Structure Implementation Affecting Implementation 
(variables 5- 1 1) (variables 12- 16) 
In terms of policy outputs, 25,330 applications for certificates were 
processed and 667 manufacturing or mining inspections were completed. 
Eight violators had been prosecuted. Actual policy impacts are difficult to 
separate from impacts of other legislation, such as compulsory school 
Denendent J 7 a r i a b k /  ' 
attendance laws, but quantitative evidence presented in Tables 1 and 3 
indicates impacts were greater in areas of child labor covered by the 
Keating-Owen bill. We infer from this evidence that there were discernable 
impacts attributable to the legislation. Census data presented earlier 
. \ 
~ o l i c ~  Compliance Actual + Perceived Major Revision 
Outpu* by Target Impacts Impacts in Statute 
Group 
indicate that steady increases in child labor had reversed by 1920. 
Additionally, as data presented earlier indicate, reductions in child labor 
occurred in industries affected by federal legislation, while child labor 
increased in industries affected by state laws alone. 
The major statute revision was overturning the bill. Although, as the 
historical account indicates, other legislation was drafted almost 
immediately. The solid level of policy outputs is consistent with the quality 
of statutory variables despite the intractability of the problem. The non- 
statutory variables give no indication of the ultimate fate of the law. 
In Sabatier and Mazmanian's model, the variable which led to 
"revision" of the law, hierarchical integration within and among 
implementing agencies, is part of the group of statutory variables which 
affect the first dependent variable--policy outputs. This independent 
variable, according to the model, affects the fifth dependent variable--major 
revisions of statutes--only indirectly through policy outputs and their 
impacts. Clearly, this was not the case. The Courts initiated a major 
revision of the statute. 
Policy outputs in this model would be expected to stop when the law 
no longer exists, but, as shown above, in this case they persisted after the 
law was overturned. The model shows that the non-statutory variables (12 
- 16) do not affect the actual impacts, however it seems here that non- 
statutory variables are quite important in determining the actual impacts. 
Public support and the war effort both affected impacts. I t  also seems likely 
that commitment and leadership skill of implementing off~cials would affect 
policy outputs. 
The model's predicted impact of groups of independent variables on 
the dependent variables of the policy implementation process is not 
consistent with the affects of these variables on the implementation of the 
Keating-Owen law. Mohr distinguishes between variance models and 
process models (Mohr, 1982). This model incorporates both variance and 
process model approaches to implementation. 
Variance models identify causes of events and explain variation in 
data. They rest on the logic that independent variables are necessary and 
sufl'icient precursors of dependent variables. Process models tell a story 
about how events occur. They predict likelihood of a final event based on 
joint probability distributions of time-ordered necessary events. The logic of 
a process model is that initial events are necessary, but not suficient to 
insure the final event will occur. 
Using Mohr's distinction between variance and process models, 
Mazmanian-and Sabatier's use of independent variables is consistent with 
the variance theory approach, but their dependent variables form a process 
model. Mohr elaborates a t  length the caveats of mixing the two types of 
models. This may be the reason connections between the independent 
variables and the stages in the implementation process (the dependent 
variables) did not fit in the case examined here. 
Using the six questions developed by Mazmanian and Sabatier to 
distill this analysis, we find that the Keating-Owen legislation had clear and 
consistent criteria for resolving goal conflicts (rules and regulations 
formulated by the mandated Child Labor Board). The legislation was based 
on sound causal theory and implementors had jurisdiction needed to achieve 
goals. Location of implementors in hierarchical structure, decision rules, 
resources and support are sufficient to facilitate, if not maximize, probability 
that implementing agents will behave as desired. Leadership and skill were 
outstanding and level of commitment was high. The program was actively 
supported by constituency groups and key legislators, but alas, the courts 
were hostile. Changing circumstances did not undermine the priority of the 
objectives embodied in the legislation. The Keating-Owen bill had a 
weakness on only part of one of the six criterion, (court support) but it 
proved to be a fatal flaw. The independent variables of this model help 
organize information about this case and clarify the strengths of the 
legislation and its support. These strengths lead us to predict that the law 
would have discernible impacts, and, even during its brief life, it did. 
Evaluation Based on the Nakamura and Smallwood Model: 
If one looked only a t  the statute and ignored the historical 
involvement of the NCLC, this might be classified as an example of the 
instructed delegation scenario. Policy makers and implementor agreed on 
the goals, but broad discretion to administer the statute was delegated to 
the implementors. However, the brief history provided above shows a 
classic example of the bureaucratic entrepreneurship scenario linking policy 
makers and policy implementors. The NCLC, a private organization funded 
through individual donations, drafted legislation for Congress to sponsor. 
NCLC, not policy makers, decided where to set the standards. NCLC 
members chose, from their own ranks, the head of the Children's Bureau, 
the agency charged with implementing federal child labor legislation. 
The evaluation criterion used in Nakamura and Smallwood's model to 
evaluate policies based on bureaucratic entrepreneurship is system 
maintenance. NCLC succeeded in maintaining broad popular and political 
concern about child labor. Progress in the general area of child labor was 
made, even through the law banning interstate transporting of goods 
produced by employers of child labor did not succeed. The letter of the law 
was not the true objective of the law. Regulation of interstate commerce 
was a vehicle through which advocates of child labor legislation sought to 
increase enforcement of state legislation. (This was the rationale for NCLC 
support of national legislation as indicated in the brief history provided 
above). Cooperation of federal and state officials even after the legislation 
was struck down indicates that the relationship established during the brief 
life of the law persisted. Given that the 1919 &venue Act passed soon 
after the Keating-Owen statute was struck down, chances are that there 
was little if any lag in federal assistance in inspections. 
An equally significant indication of progress toward NCLC's objectives 
is subsequent reference in reports and documents to whether laws met 
Keating-Owen or the federal standards. Even though the law was no longer 
in effect, the standards for child labor it established became a benchmark 
against which other standards were measured. The provision in federal 
contracts requiring contractors meet Keating-Owen standards indicates 
that, in less than a year, the standards gained acceptance. Further, the 
Adjutant General extended Keating-Owen standards to military posts and 
federal reservations. The standard was established and maintained despite 
demise of the law. Since the Nakamura and Smallwood scenario that best 
describes this case evaluates performance primarily on system maintenance, 
performance of the statute on goal attainment and efficiency is less 
important. Thus progress made in inspections and certification, which 
seems quite substantial given the short time involved, are not the primary 
criterion for evaluating success of the statute. I t  seems advantageous not to 
limit evaluation to only the criterion associated with the scenario is 
primarily identified. The likelihood that multiple scenarios are operating 
seems high and, as is seen here, the scenario may differ depending on the 
time frame considered. Comparison of the Models of Public Policy 
Implementation: 
One primarily difference between these two models is their ability to 
accommodate a historical perspective. The Mazmanian and Sabatier model 
examines an individual statute and focuses on a cross-section of a process. 
The Nakamura and Smallwood model, due to its unstructured nature, is not 
constrained to evaluating variables a t  fixed points in time. 
Thinking about the time dimension involved in these two models, 
poses questions of where to place the boundaries of public policy 
implementation. Is public policy .implementation confined to the 
implementation of one statute? Does it encompass the long-term progress of 
social change in a policy area? If we are looking at a single statute, where, 
in the process of social change in the policy area, does this statute fall? Is 
the change process just beginning, so that the legislation is breaking new 
ground? Is the legislation consolidating past gains? Or, is the legislation 
culminating decades of unrelenting effort? If the focus is narrow, important 
contextual factors will be omitted. If the focus is broad, important micro- 
level factors may be lost in the wealth of information. 
When we limit our focus to a single statute, the secondary..effects of 
implementation may be obscured. In this case, the NCLC was primarily 
interested in the secondary effect of improved implementation of state 
statutes. The federal law was a vehicle to accomplish this obliquely, since it 
could not be done directly. Since the statute was struck down, the 
secondary effects were the only long-term impacts of this law. 
While the scenarios of the Nakamura and Smallwood model seem 
better suited to analyze the broader picture provided by a historical analysis 
of public policy implementation, analysis using the Mazmanian and Sabatier 
model provides greater detail an is more helpful in sorting out the multitude 
of factors affecting implementation. Conclusions: 
The model presented by Mazmanian and Sabatier, focuses on detailed 
cross-sectional information, but is unable to cope adequately important 
secondary impacts and contextual factors captured by the historical 
perspective used here. The model also gives no indication that, with good 
performance on all criteria but part of one, demise of the legislation should 
be expected. Mazmanian and Sabatier's linkage of the groups of 
independent variables to the stages of the policy implementation process 
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was not supported by the evidence of this case. This model does, however, 
quite accurately represent the strengths of the legislation itself. The 
Mazmanian and Sabatier model comprehensively assesses a legislative slice 
in the stream of policy on child labor. 
The model presented by Nakamura and Smallwood, while not as rich 
in detail as that of Mazmanian and Sabatier, appears to capture the flavor 
of the policy stream more accurately. This model makes a bigger break 
with the rational model of implementation by focusing on interactions 
among actors rather than legislation. The bureaucratic entrepreneurship 
scenario fits well with events of the case. The associated evaluation 
criterion, system maintenance, seemed appropriate though limited. The 
sensitivity of this model to the span of time considered may present some 
problems in application, but perhaps one solution to this dilemma is to 
evaluate the policy based on several time frames. The longer term 
bureaucratic entrepreneurship scenario in tandem with the shorter-term 
delegated instruction scenarios best evaluate implementation of Keating- 
Owen. 
One important difference between these two models is the definition 
of policy implicit in each model. The Sabatier and Mazmanian model clearly 
considers a law to be a policy. The Nakamura and Smallwood model can 
accommodate laws, programs and guidelines as policy. To examine public 
policy only as realized in one program and its products ignores these 
interactions and presents policy as a single event, isolated from other 
policies, laws and programs. We have alluded on several occasions in this 
paper to the link between compulsory school attendance laws and child labor 
laws. Progress in each of these policy areas affected progress in the other. 
Historical analysis of public policy implementation allows us to consider 
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policy as a process embedded in the social fabric, reflected in and reflecting 
laws and programs. 
Clearly, detailed consideration of the variables presented in the 
Mazmanian and Sabatier model helps us make sense of mountains of 
implementation data. The focus on legislation in the Sabatier and 
Mazmanian model, however, narrows our analysis in ways that obscure the 
future outcomes of this case. The emphasis of the Nakamura and 
Smallwood model on nature of the relationships among actors in policy 
arenas shifts our attention to the patterns of interaction that maintained 
energy and momentum in this case. The multiple criterion for success 
offered by the Nakamura and Smallwood model seem to better predict what 
the future held in the area of child labor policy. 
The value of historical analysis of public policy implementation is 
clearly illustrated by this exercise. Evaluations of the Keating-Owen law in 
1918 might well have considered it  a major failure, yet its secondary 
impacts were substantial. Predictions based on the status of the law itself 
would not have correctly assessed its importance in the process of policy 
implementation. One wonders how some of the failed laws and programs of 
the 1960's and 70's will look from the 2 1st century, when viewed as  part of 
a completed policy implementation process. 
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TEXT OF FEDERAL CmD-LABOR LAW OF 1916 AND RULES 
AND REGULATIONS FOR ITS EWORCEMRNT. 
A l l  ACT TO PRBVEWl' IRTERSTATE COMMERCE U THE PRODUCTS OP 
CHlLD LABOK' AHD ?OR OTHER PURPOSES. 
Be it CMdCd b y  Uie Sewie and Aowe of nCp~~dnl~r.t iveu O/ the 
UnW Sdobo of Amrriaa in Congress a s s n n W ,  Tlrat no prcnluner, 
manufnctumr, or doalar ehol) ehip or dofiver for shipmcnt in ink+ 
etnte or foreign comrnorce any article or cotnmodity tlre product of 
any mine or qucury, e i tu~ted in the lTnii.oil States, k, which within 
tbuty days prior to the time of the romovaf of such product there  
from children under tbe age of eixteen years have been nmploged or 
permitted to work, or any articlo or commodity the product of any 
mill, cannery, workahop, factory, or manrrfacturing eetablidunert, 
eituatsd in the I'nited S t a t a ,  in wlrich within thirty daye prior t~ tlre 
removal of such product Lhorofrom childran under tbe nge of forrr- 
teen yetus have been employed or porrnitted to work, or chiJdron 
betweon tbe wee of f o u ~ e n  yeare and eixteen yeere brive bmn 
employed or permitted. tu work more than eight hours in any day, 
or mare Cban eix d a . ~  in rrlg week, or afbr  the hour of eoven o'clock 
pontmeridian, or hefore the hour of eix o'clock antwseridicrn: I'm- 
d d ,  That a prmecution rntl conviction of a defenclant for the 
ahipmcnt or dalivcuy for ehipmrnt of any article or cornmodit$ under 
tho coaditions htrreia pmhihited @hell be a bar to any furCher promwu- . 
tion agaiagt tho mmo dnfondmt for shipmanta or doliveries for 
shipment of mj e~ich arLicle or commodity before the b e g i ~ i n g  ol 
mid proemution. 
SEO. 2. That the Attorney Ccnoral, the h r a t a r y  of Commmn, 
and the Secretary of Labur ehall constitute a board to make and 
publiah from time to time uniform rulae a ~ d  regulations for. atmy- 
out the pmvieions of this ect. 
SEC. 3. That for the purpme of emuring propar e n f o r c ~ t  d &Ilia 
mcG che Secmtary d LAbor, or any pereon duly authorined by bim, 
ehrll have errthority to enter and in~pnct a t  any time ~nintw, qear r iq  
rnilln, c n ~ ~ r i ~ e ,  work~hope, frct,oriee, rnrr~~~facturinp: mtnblishmente, 
and other places in \vlrich gootls aro produced or held k)r intnretate 
commcrco; ant1 the Secretai-y of Labor ehaU have authorihy to e~nyloy 
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~ l ~ r h  mi~hmu~ for &Ire purpo6wwr of Lh act M r1r.y htvu hue k 
limo be authoriacd by ap1)ropriation or other Lw. 
Scc. 4. That it strall be the duty 01 ooch didrid attorrmy b whom 
the L%etary of Ilnhor  hall report any violation of this act, or b 
whcurr rny State lactory or mining or quarry inspeclor, cornmi+ 
Bomr d labor, S t a b  mwlicd inulleotor, or school-attendmoo &cer, 
ru any other pclrsolr abeU pruacmnt eatiahctory evidoace d any such 
violation to cruae approprietc, prwxwdiagm to be cammeru.d and 
~ ~ O W C I I ~ N I  in 1)re pmpnr cuurta of the l'nifed States witlrout &dsy 
for Qre crltwcfimant of ttre p n n d i ~ i ~  n such cseos h e i n  providotl:, 
P m d r d ,  Tlrat ty,llaiux in Chin act Wl be coustrued to apply b 
bma fide boys' and girU canning clubs recognhd by the Agriculburd 
1)qmrtmnnt of the eovera! StstcrJ und of tho I-nited &&a 
Sue 6. 'Shnt 4u.y pertmu who violoteo any of the provimom of mo- 
tim one d this ect, t~ who rtrfumxa or obetnwb entry or inspection 
wdrotir.ed hy ecrtion threa of thin act, shdl  for aaah ofle~rse prim 
to tho firat convicGi~)n ol R U C ~  peraon under the pv ie iens  of t h b  act, 
I Iae pnmhocl by I fine of not m e  thnn $200, and shall for each dlcnne 
euheequcurt 60 mdr convictim bo punished by a fine of not mare tiran 
$1,000, nor Im than or by ir4prieuPmPnt lor not more than throe 
montlla, or by both wch AIM end io~prhmmcnt. in the disrrekiu~ 
d tln) 00rmt: Y d d ,  That no deele+ rhdl  be p r m u t d  under thg 
pmwisions d tlria aat for e ehipmenb, delivery fcu a h i p m n t  or t r a m  
por-ion who mtrbliehtm a guarnoty iseued by the prvsan t)p w b m  
the p d a  dipped or d a l i v d  for a h i p m d  or traoeportrtion r ~ e q  
maaufucturnl or p n n l a d ,  d e n t  in Lbe I*nitd S t a h ,  to Lte effect 
t h ~ t  eu~lr  good0 wore p d w d  ar r~ar~lrl.oburod in a mim or qumr 
in whicb within tbirhy &.p prior to &heir wmoad tbaekom mo 
clrilclrcn under the ego of ~ixtcren yearn were employed ar pmmitted 
to work, or in a mill, cnnncry, workebp, fwbry, or manrrlactruiog 
eatablislrrnt~nt, in which within thirty daye prior to the removal of 
euch goode thol.efronr no childrrn under t)re affd d ht%em pear 
were cunplepl ur parinittd to work, nor children between tbe 
uf fourtesn y*am and r i ~ h n  pan3 employed cu pemitted to mark 
more then eight kunua in eny day or 63wm than six &p i. any 
week ot nftw the h r r  s f  wvw o'&k paatm~lidiut  o r  befm the 
hour of uix o'(:Iock antemrrridin~r; and in suah went, if &he p u r t y  
conteinn any f a l ~ e  totanoot o l  n metcKid I d ,  tho parantor  e b d  
be amenable to proeecution andl to the fine or imprisonmont provided 
by thie soction for violation of the provisrione d thie act. !bid gallcb 
aaty, to d o r d  the protection Jrwe prorided, ehall canbin the nnmb. 
and addrem of tlm peraon giving the sam6. And @cd fi&, 
Thad no prodnoor, mnottfrrctorer, or dealer ehall ha p r o s d  under 
this act for tho hipmttnt, delivery for ehipment, or tnnsprtat inil  
of a product of any mine, quarry, mill, cannery, worhahop, facta-, 
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or manufacturing establishment, if the only employment ther&, 
within thirty d a p  prior to the removal of such product therefrom, d 
a child under the age d aixteen years has been that of a child re to 
whom the producer or manufacturer ha3 in good faith procarsd, 
the time of emplo~ng such child, and hss ince in good faith relied 
upon and kept on file a certificate, issued in such form, under such 
conditions, and by such persons as may be prescribed by the board, 
shoring the child to be of such an age that the shipment, delivery for 
shipment, or transportation wnq not prohibited by this act. Anp 
person who knowingly makes a false statement or presents false 
eridence in or in relation to any such certificate or application there- 
for shall be amenable to prosecution and to the fine or imprisonment 
provided by this section for violations of this act. In any State 
design~ted by the board, an employment certificate or other similar 
paper as to the age of the child, issued under the laws of that State 
and not incon~istent with the provisions of this act, shall have the 
same force and effect as a certificate herein provided for. 
SEC. 6. That the word "person" as used in this act shall be con- 
strued to include any indiridual or corporation or the members of 
any partnership or other unincorporated association. The term 
"ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce" 
as used in this act means to transport or to ship or deliver for ship 
ment from any State or Territory or the District of Columbia to or 
through any other State or Territory or the District of Columbia 
or to  any foreign county; and in the case of a dealer means only to 
transport or to ship or deliver for shipment from the State, Terri- 
toi-y, or district of manufacture or production. . 
SEC. 7. That this act shall take effect from and after one year from 
thk date of its pasage. 
Spprored, September 1, 1916. 
--- .- rr...... ."..A-r "A- n...*nrrrn C.-- -- r..CI......n-a A- 

Appendix B 
RUZ,ES AND REOULATIONS FOR CARRYING OUT THE PROVISIONS 01 
AN ACT OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES APPROmD 
SEPTEMBER 1, 1916, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO PREVENT INTERSTAn 
COMMXRCE IIO THE PRODUCTS OF CHED LABOR, AND FOR OTBBR 
PURPOSES," ADOPTBD BY TBB BOARD CONSISTIIOO OF TEE ATTORNBY 
GENERAL, TEE SBCRETARY OF COMMERCE, AND THE SECRBTARY 
OF LABOR, AUGUST 14, 1917. 
Regulrtlon 1. Certificates of age. 
Cortificatei of age, in order to protect the procluccr, merrufucturor, 
or dealer from prosecution, shell be either: 
1. Federal age certijlcates issued by persona hereafter to bc dcs;P 
m t t d  by the board fw chiuren between 16 and 17 years of age wlun 
employment i n  or atout a mine or quarry is  contemplnlrd nr~d.for chitdrm 
betwetn 14 and 16 ytars t$ age wlrm evnploynscnt in a mill, cannery, 
wmkeliop, factory, or nnnujactl~ring establiehmd is  con,tem.l)latd. 
Strclr ctrlijiratas s h f l l l  conk~in t h ~  Jo l ldng  injonnalivn: (I) Name of 
chiltl; (2) place aitd tlote of birth of child, together with statemmt of 
r~irlvirce on whicfb this ia b a d ,  except whtn a phyeician'u cert@cde . 
of ph?/.pical age is  ncrt~ptrd hy the i~su ing  ogEcer, in  which cane phymcul 
&r nAo11 613 rltovm; (3) scx and cob ;  (4)  ~ g ~ 1 u r e  of child; (6) M ~ I C  
trlrtl ntlt1rr.v~ 01 cchilrl's parent, guardiun, or custodiun; (6) signature of 
v'ssrtiltg r$licer; (111d (7) t ln t~  uncl pluce of issuance. 
2. I ~ ~ ~ O ? / I ~ I F I I ~ ,  aye, or v orking ctrtijcnl~, permit, or paper iseud 
~rntlo. Stntr arrtlrorily in szirh Sttitcs us  are lrertaftrr clesiqttated by the 
/loft 1 Y I .  
Regulation 2. Proof of age. 
I'orsotr; nrrthorizctl by tlrb botrrd to i ~ s u e  ago coi.tificateu untlcr the 
c~nthi)~~ily,of ~lris nc:t sllrrll issue such ao1.1ificate~ only upon the appli- 
cation in pt!rson of tllo cl~iltl dmiring employmrnt, accompanied 
by its ptil.c-ri(,, gun~~tlittrr, or. cudtodian, and after Iraving received, 
c~xsrnitic~l, 111rt1 npp~wvotl tloe\~mc!nt.nry ovidcnce of 1160 &owing that 
I . I I I ~  c . l ~ i l t l  is 1 4  ycsriln of ago or ovtrr i f  c!tnploy~nt!nt i t r  tr mill, cnnaery, 
wo~.k~ltol), f~tc:l.ory, or tr~tt~rr~f~icturi~rg u~tt l~lbl~mc!trt is contornl)lnted, 
or. Ihttt ilro t:l~iltl i8 I~clwcc~rt 16 untl 17 yoora of ngo if employlnont in 
or nI)o111 ti I I I ~ I I C  or quarry in coatomplated; wlrich ovid<+ace ~htill 
cotrqist 01 orri! of (110 following-rrrrmctl proofs of age, to l)e rocluirctl it1 
t,111! o~.dor Iru~.t!in tltsig~rated, as follows: 
((1) A I)irtll ccrtifi(:ato or nttcrqted t~.anso~.ipt tlrereof issuet1 by A 
i ~ o g i s t l . ~  of vital str~ti$t,i(~q or 0t~l101' oflicer clrargt!d wit11 tlro duty of 
~.t:c:o~.dir~g 1)irtlrs. 
( b )  A roco~.d of btrptisrn or a certificate or tlttevted transcript 
l.lrnre6f ~howing tho i1at.o of birth nnd place of baptism of tire child. 
(c) A I~o t~n  fitlo conturnporary record of tlte date artd place of the 
clrild'e birtlr knpt in tho Ilihle in wlricll tho rocorde of the birtlre in 
tlro family of tlre clrild are preservad, or othor doc~lrnont~ry ovitlonce 
satisfnctory to t l~u Yocrutary of Lal~or or such pereon ns Ire rnay h i g -  
nnte, suclr a8 a pnssport allowing tho ago of the chilcl, a certificate of 
arrivnl in tho Unitu~l Stutos issued by tlitr United States immigration 
oflicnrs ancl ehowi~rg tho ago of the child, or a lifo ineurance policy; 
~wovitlvd thnt RII(:II ot,lror sali~factory t1ocu111~nlary evitlonce htre heon 
i ~ r  t+xiuI.orr(!o trt I ~ ~ I L N ~ ,  OII( \  yvtir prior to 1110 ti11rt9 it in oflorod in ovi~It\rrco; 
snd ~>rovitlctl fr~rt~lrcrr !,lrrrt a school rocortl or rr prrent'e, pardian'e, 
or ate1odiu11'e ellitlevit, curtificeto, or othor writtort etetemont of 
ago shnll not bo accepted except ae specified in paragraph (4. 
(d) A cartificata signed by a public-health phyeician or a publie 
echool physician, epocifying what in the opinion of euch phyeician is 
the physical ago of tlre child; euch certificate ehall ehow the height 
and wcqigl~t of tho chilcl and othor facta co~lccrnilig its phyeicd dovelop- 
ment revodod by euch exanlinetiou and up011 which the opinion of 
1&71W0-23-12 
rbt I)hgnician .s to the pbyaieal ago of tho child is luud. A ~)nn~rt 'n, 
gulrnlinn'e, or cuatodian'n mrtificatn .a to the . go  of llro elrilcl a1111 
nword of age as pivot, on the myistor of t l ~ e  cliool wlricl, tlro ebiltl 
lirrrt. attanded or in tlls echool consus, if obtainalde, ellall l o  *r~l)rrrit- 
tod with the phpician'e certificate ellowing pt~yaicd ago. 
'fhe officer issuing tho age certificatu for a child ellall nquiro tho 
c!vitlar~co of 11go sptaifiod in eutwliviaiol~ (a) in proft:re~roo to lhrt 
almrifiotl in any subsoquont subdi6sion rind ellnu not nccopt tbt, 
ovitlence of '&go permittd by any euhseque~lt subdivision unlns iro 
AIIIIII rccoivo and filo evidel~co t l ~ n t  lro ovitlorrco of ago rtrtlr~ircd by 
1110 ~wocodirrg eul)division or srlhdivisions can not be obtnirrotl. 
Regalation 3. Authoritation of acceptance of Stete oertMcates. 
Stn\es in which tho ago, ornploymor~t, or working certificates, pur- 
pitn, or pnpom nre issued ulrder Stnto er~thority aul)st.n~~l.inlly in 
accorcl with dhe roqr~iramonts of the ncb allti with regulntiol~ 2 haroof 
may ho tlceignntnd, in nccontance wit11 section 5 of the act, as St,utus 
in whic:lr certificnt,os iesr~ad undar Stnte nuthority shall Iravo bho 
eorrle f ~ r c o  and nlloct as tlrosa is~rrotl rrntlnr 1110 clir~ct nullrori1.y of 
t l ~ i ~  nct, O X C ~ J ) ~  LLB itr~lividrrttl cnrtificntes nrny I)o .q~tsoc:t~tlocl or 
rovokocl in t ~ c o r d a n c ~ ~  with rcgol~~iortn 4 anti 8. ( ! c t ~ * t , i l i v t t l t j ~  i l l  
S t .s t .~~ so dnsi,pnt.c!d slrnll hnve t l r i ~  forco arrd offact for tht, ~~!r.iod 
d t,unn spncilial by the I)onrtl, u~rhbss ill the juclg~no~rt of 1110 l~(mrt{ 
tlro withdrawal of eut!lr aull~orizntion a t  an onrlior ctatn ~ooms tlnsirn- 
hln for the effective ntlrnil~istration of tllo act. Cortnifit:nttw roqr~iril~g 
cor~tlir.ione or rcrst.ric~.ions acltlitiond t,o tlroae required by tlre l'ndcrnl 
act, or 1)y the rules rind rog~~ltit,iorrs ~ l l t l l l  not be doenled to I)n iocou- 
eialonb with tho ncl.. 
Regulation 4. Suepansion or reoocatlon of cerU6utes. 
SP.(TION 1. Wlrsnovor nn i~~sl)actor duly authorieod under lhie act 
e1111ll tint1 t h ~ t  ho ~ g e  of a child employed in nny mill, csnrlory, 
workshop, factory, rr~nnrrfacturing est,nhlie\rmorrt, mitre, or quarry 
ma given on n olrl.ifiet,ttj ia ineorrtrt,, or tbot tire time nwonl is not 
knpt in accztrd~nce witah reylstiorr 8, lre elrall notify t l~o  alrilcl, the 
employer, nnd the iesuirrg oflicor thnt the certificate or t Ire ~rccel)tnrrce 
of a Stato certificate for the purpoeea of this act ia euaponded and 
irrtlicato such suspsrreion on the cartoificnte or ccrrtifiabs. 
SIC(:. 2. A etatenlent of the fact.e for which the arrepuneio~~ wlra 
mnclo ehrll bo forwrrtld by the ir~apector t o  the Secretary of Labor, 
or such pcrson as ho may de~ignnte, who will oithur (a) rtwokn or 
withdrnw the certificate or the acceptance of the cert,ificete, or (b )  
veto the suspension, ae in hie judgment the fncta of the c a ~ e  warrant. 
Due notice ehall be eent to the cl~ild'e parent, qerdislr, or c u e b  
dis~r,  to the employer, and ta the issuing officer of tbe action taken iin 
rogard to a euepended certificnte. 
SI.:~:. I. I f  tho ~ ~ ~ q ~ n e i o r r  of a at tiliceto k v e l d ,  rr now corlilit~ate 
si~thll 110 irlnuod u11or1 tlitl eurrolrtltrr uf t,lru ot~o surrper~dal. If fur noy 
r*b;tsolr H I I C ~ ~  IIOW ~ ) r t i ~ i c u h  C U I ~  nut bu ~l~ta i t lod front a s t a b  kqtlirrg 
cdlictrr, tltu lrotico of tho vulo if attuclrod to a clunpoodod cortiiicatu . 
sI1~111 )o rocogui~od a~rd  uccol)ted au mouting tho requirum~rb of , 
st't-i iolr 5 of tllu act. 
Ragahtion 5. Revoked or rogaedd caillk.(as. 
A rt~vokod or etrspendotl cortificato will not protect s protluo~r, 
I I I ~ I I I U ~ R C ~ I I M ) ~ ,  or doalar from proaocrltion nndor ewtion 5 of tho act 
n f t ~ r  roticu of such eusponsiorr or mvocation, axcopt as provided i l l  
~.r.~q~lntion 4. 
Rsgul.tlon 6. Hours d amplqmat. 
111 tlatcwnlining whotlrt!r clrildror~ ltutmnon 14 and 16 ycnm of a p  
) I I I \ . ( ~  Imelr e~nployotl rnorr, tlr~krr oight houm i r r  any dny the Irouru of 
c\l~lployrnont nhnll 1)o corrrl)r~tod from tho titlie flre child ie roquircttl 
or prrnri(,ted or suffcred to bo nt the place of employmerrt up to tlre 
t i l l r t?  whtm hn Inavos off work for thcr dny, exclusive of a amgle con- 
t inrlorls pcritni of a tlofinito Itlngth of tir~re durilrg wl~iclr tho ctiild is 
olf n.orli trrltl not srlhjcct to cnll. 
A c.11iJtl irlriy 11ot I)o orrr~loyc!tl for rrioru t1r111r six ct~~rnt!~\rtivit rlays. 
Regulation 8. Time reford. 
S I . : ~ ~ V N  1. A lbne reeorti ~ 1 1 4  1x1 kkrpt daily b.y ~rn)Jumm or 
rnlrlr~~facturen, ehrming tile hour4 of employment in acmnlance with 
rc.,grlrrt.ion ti, for each and every child botwecn 14 srd 16 y m r ~  of trgq 
wtrt!ti~er trmployecl orr a iirt~e o r  a piece-rato his. 
SIN:. 2. (:ertilicatw of age for cJ1iltlr011 employ4 in any tnirle or 
q u n w  or in any nrill, crurncrg, workshop, factory, or manufacturing 
estal)li.&mclrt may be suspended or revoketl for failure on t l ~ e  part of 
11 rn~rnuftlctr~mr or producer to keep tirno records as rquircd I)y thb 
r c ~ t ~ l ~ r t i o r ~  or for falso or frnutlr~lorit o111rit1~ ~rrade therein. 
Regulation 9. Inspection. 
AII  itrspector duly nutborizcd under tlrh act s1mN lrave tho riglrt to 
cr~t~cr a r ~ l  in9peet any nliuo or quarry, mill, cmrrrery, workshop, fuc- 
tory, or rrrr~rr~~f~~cCrlri~rg ostollbhmant, a t d  other placm iu which 
got~ls  nro protlr~cetl or lraltl for intelntato commorco; to itrspect the 
cnrtilicalan of uge kept ou lilo, tilrro records and wch other rocorda of 
tlrc producer or murufacturcr m may aid iu the enforcsment of tbe 
~rct;  to irnvo accaqs to freight bills, shippen' receipts, or other records 
of sltipmcnts in i t ~ h ~ t n t o  or foroign commorce,ko~)t by railroads, 
os~)rcss cor~i~)nnicx, stcnrrlsl~ip lines, or othel. trarrsportution compnnies 
eo frrr as tlroy rlray t~id ilr tlro o~rforcerrlerrt of the act. 
Regulation 10. Obstmctln# lnspwtlon. 
SECTION 1. It sllnll be tlio duty of a producer or mnliufacturor to 
procluce for oxurninntion by an inspector the certificates of age kept 
on file nnd any chiltl in tile employ of a ~nanufacturcr or producer 
whom tho inspoctor lnny ask to sco. (:onconling or proventing or 
nttompting to concnil or. pravcl~t n cl~iltl froin appcar i~~g Loforo nn 
inspector or boing oxrrrr~ined by liirn or l~irideril~g or tlolnyi~~g in 
any wny an inspector i l l  tho pcrformanco of his dutic!s shnll be con- 
sitlcrcd an obstrl~ction of i tlspection with in tho ~ncn l~ i r~g  of soction 5. 
SEO. 2. NO OR-IICP, mnnngor, or otl~cr pcrsol~ i l l  chargo of promises 
or rccortls SIIRU bo subjcct to prosoct~tiut~ for obstructioli of inspec- 
tion if tho inspector shall rofu~o upon rcquovt to subrnitlris idonti- 
ficntion cnnl for cxnn~i~ratioti I)y such owocr, nlntingcr, or othor 
pcrson. 
Redulation I I. Removal. 
Witlldrawnl for nriy purpose of an article or commodity from the 
place whore i t  was mnnufacturcd or produced conatitutas a rclnoval 
thcrcof within tho ~ncnning of  the act; and tho SO-day poriotl within 
mllicli crnploymct~t of clriltlrcn contrary to tho stnntlnrtla proscribed 
in section 1 of tilo act rcsr~lts in prol~il)iting e l ~ i p m o ~ t  i r ~  ir~torstate 
or forcigu commcrco sllnll bo computccl from t h ~ t  tit~rc. 
Regulation 12. Guaranty. 
S E ~ I O N  1. A guarnnty to protcct n dealer from prosce~r lion ulrdor 
soction 5 of the nct nllnll bo signocl by and contuin tllo name and 
ad(lrm9 of tho mnnufacturer or producer; i t  sllnll bo specific, covor- 
ing the particular goods shipped or delivered for el~iprnent or trane- . 
portation, and shall not be a general guaranty covering aU goode 
mnnufacturcd or produccd or to be manufactured or produced by 
the guarantor. I t  mny be incorporatcd in or attached to or stamped 
or printed on tile bill of enle, bill of Inding, or othor scl~cdule that 
cnnt.nins a livt of tlro gocwls which tho rnutlufnctt~rcr or producer 
in tcntls to gunrnn too. 
Seo. 2. A dcalcr slrippiug .goods from a State otllcr than the State 
of manufacture or pro<luction does not require a guarnnty in ordor 
to bo protcctcd from prosecution. (See eec. 6 of the act.) 
SEO. 3. A guaranty s~~bstantially in  accordance with the following 
forms will comply with the requirements of the act: 
For pmduc(r of mints or q u d 8 -  
(1 or we), the undorsignocl, do hereby guarantee that the articloe or cornmoditia 
liatad herein (or specify the eame) were produced by (me or ue) iu a mine or q q  
in  a l ~ i c h  within 30 daye prior to removal of such product therofroml no childron 
rlncler the tqte of 16 yoare wore employed or permitted ta wort. 
(Name and place of hnrinusa of producer or manufacturer.) 
(Dale of removal.) 
Fnr proclrccta of a mill, cnntvry, wnrkahoy,jaclory, or manufaduring utoblid~mmt- . 
( I  or we), the ~ ~ n d e r s i g ~ ~ o d ,  do heroby g~urnntee that the articles or cbmmodities 
lintotl haroin (or npecify tho w n u )  wore protluced or manufactured by (me or us) ' 
in a (mill, rannory, worknllr~p, Inctory, or man~~facturing establishment) In which 
within 30 tlaya prior to tho rori~oval of such prvduct themfroml no children under the 
n p  of 14 years wore employed or permittad to work, nor childron between the ~ g e s  
of 14 yeare and 10 yoam wore omployed or prmitted to work more than eight h o w  
in any day or more than nix daye in any week, or after the hour of 7 o'clock p. m. or 
hcfore tho hour of 0 o'clock a. tn. 
(Nnme and placo of b118illosn of producor or manufacturer.) 
(I j r lo  of rrrnovnl.) 
Regulation 13. Alterrtlon and rmendmmt of regulrtlons. 
'l'hcvo reg~rletions may bo nltored or arnendod a t  any timo without 
pravious notico by tho board as constituted in eection 2 of the act, 
- - 
IDurlnff the n ~ o ~ ~ t l ~ o l  Bepl mhnr, 1917, s rnqni~leclt~rer or produmr MI #uMILuII for tb b u n  
.'withl~~ 30 di~ys yrlor lo 1110 remuv.d lherolrom" the c l a w  "on md after Bepbrnber 1. 1017.1 
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